A function and f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is said to be t-private if there exists a (randomized) communication protocol for computing f , such that no coalition of at most t participants can infer any additional information from the execution of the protocol other than what follows from their inputs and the value of f . It is known that every n-argument function f defined over finite domains can be computed n−1 2 -privately. The classes of 1-private two-argument functions and of t-private Boolean functions admit relatively simple characterizations. In contrast, the general question of characterizing the class of t-private functions of n arguments is still open. The only technique that appears in the literature for proving non-t-privacy of a function f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) over a finite domain, where n ≥ 3 and n 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, uses a reduction to the two-party case via a partition argument. A necessary condition for f being t-private is that for every partition (S;S) of the parties {1, 2, . . . , n} such that both |S| ≤ t and |S| ≤ t, the two-argument function obtained by viewing f as a function of {x i } i∈S and {x i } i∈S is 1-private. The question whether the use of such partition reductions together with the two-party characterization is powerful enough to characterize privacy in the multiparty case was raised as an open problem in previous works. These works also exhibit an affirmative answer for specific classes of functions. We answer this question negatively. We show that even if more general partition reductions are used, in which the n parties are partitioned into k sets (2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1) rather than just two, those reductions are still too weak to characterize privacy. On the other hand, we show that increasing the number of sets k does give some extra characterization power. C 2001 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
A set of n parties, each holding an input value x i from some domain X i , wishes to distributively compute a given function f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). The participants communicate via a complete network of reliable and secure channels (no eavesdropping). The participants are honest-they send messages according to the prescribed randomized protocol for f . However, a subset of the participants (a coalition) might get together after the execution of the protocol in an attempt to infer additional information on the inputs of non-coalition parties. Additional information is any information that does not follow from the value of the function, f ( x), and the inputs of the coalition parties. A protocol F is called t-private if no coalition containing at most t parties can get any additional information from F's execution.
Private multiparty computation of general functions, under various models and assumptions, has been the subject of a considerable amount of work, originating from [2, 4, 8, 11] . The model considered here is a minimalistic one, referred to as the model of "honest but curious" parties, in the information-theoretic setting. Stronger adversarial scenarios, including Byzantine [2, 4] and adaptive [3] adversaries, have been studied in the literature. Negative results on private computation in our model hold in the more adversarial (information-theoretic) models as well.
The seminal works of [2, 4] showed that all n-argument functions over finite domains X i can be computed n−1 2 -privately. In [5] it is shown that there exists a dense privacy hierarchy: for any n−1 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 2 there exists an n-argument function which is t-private (i.e., can be computed by a t-private protocol) but is not (t + 1)-private. In the works of [1, 10] a complete characterization of 1-private two-argument functions is given. The general question of characterizing the class of t-private functions 1 A preliminary version of this work appeared in the Proceedings of the Fourth Israel Symposium on Theory of Computing and Systems (ISTCS 1996) . 2 Supported by the fund for promotion of research at the Technion. 3 Current address: DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, 96 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8018.
of n-argument, for any n ≥ 3 and
The only technique which appears in the literature for proving non-t-privacy of functions with n ≥ 3 arguments uses a reduction to the two-party case, via a partition argument [5] [6] [7] . If f is t-private, where n 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, then for every partition (S;S) of the parties {1, 2, . . . , n} such that |S|, |S| ≤ t, the two-argument function obtained by viewing f as a function of {x i } i∈S and {x i } i∈S is 1-private.
In [6] , in the course of proving a characterization of t-private Boolean functions, it is shown that, with respect to Boolean functions, such a partition argument always suffices for proving non-t-privacy. That is, for any n-argument Boolean function which is not t-private, there exists a suitable partition of its variables into two sets such that the induced two-argument function is not 1-private. A similar result holds for a certain class of symmetric functions [7] . The question whether such an argument always suffices for proving non-t-privacy in the general case is raised as an open problem in [5, 7] , where extensive use of the partition technique has been made.
In this work we provide a negative answer to this question: partitions cannot always be used to prove non-privacy. The proof starts in Section 4, where we give a necessary condition for the (n −1)-privacy of any n-argument function that generalizes the necessary (and sufficient) condition of the two-party case. This result opens up the possibility of proving non-privacy of an n-argument function by partitioning its variables into k > 2 sets and using the k-party necessary condition to show that the induced k-argument function is not private. Now how powerful are those generalized partition arguments? Is it possible that their use together with a characterization of all private k-argument functions, where k is bounded by some fixed K , is universal for non-privacy proofs? Section 5 addresses these questions. We show that the power of generalized partition arguments is in fact rather limited. We construct an n-argument function g n which is not fully private (i.e., not (n − 1)-private), but every nontrivial partition of its variables induces a fully private function. Putting it in another way, the non-privacy of g n is very "fragile." It collapses whenever any two (or more) of the parties unite. This means that the non-privacy of g n cannot be reduced via partition arguments to the non-privacy of some function of k < n variables. On the other hand, we show that increasing the number of sets in partitions does give some extra power. For any k ≥ 3 we construct nargument functions (n > k) which, for some t < n − 1, can be proven to be non-t-private using partition into k sets, but cannot be proven to be non-t-private using partition into a smaller number of sets.
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we define the model of distributed computation that is used, give a formal definition of privacy in this model, and introduce some notation.
The system consists of a complete synchronous network of n honest parties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n with secure and reliable point-to-point communication (no eavesdropping). (By saying that the parties are honest it is meant that they send messages according to a predetermined protocol F.) At the beginning of an execution, each party P i has an input x i ∈ X i (no probability space is associated with the inputs). In addition, each party has a random independent input r i taken from a source of randomness R i . The parties wish to compute some given function f ( x). To this end, they exchange messages as prescribed by the protocol F. Messages are sent in rounds, where in each round every party can send a message to every other party. The protocol's definition determines which message a party sends in the kth round as a function of its input, its random input, the messages it received so far, and the identity of the receiver. At the end of the computation, one of the parties (say P 1 ) outputs the value f ( x).
The communication passed in the network when the parties have inputs x and random inputs r is denoted C( x, r ) and is represented by a vector of strings, whose kth entry includes the concatenation of all messages sent during kth round of the execution of the protocol, parsed according to sender and receiver. For a given communication C and a subset T of the n parties, C T denotes the restriction of C to the messages sent or received by the parties in T (i.e., C T excludes from C all messages sent internally between the parties of T ).
Let F be a randomized protocol which computes f ( x) (with no error). We say that a coalition (i.e., a set of parties) T does not learn any additional information from the execution of F (other than what follows from its input and f ( x)) if the following holds: For every two inputs x, y that agree in their T entries (i.e., ∀i ∈ T : x i = y i ) and satisfy f ( x) = f ( y), and for every choice of random inputs {r i } i∈T , the messages seen by T are identically distributed. That is, for every communication C,
where the probability space is over all random inputs in T , namely {r i } i∈T (each r i is distributed according to R i and they are all independent). We say that F is t-private if any coalition T , which contains at most t parties, does not learn any additional information from the execution of the protocol F. We say that a function f is t-private if there exists a t-private protocol computing f . We say that the n-argument function f is fully private if it is (n − 1)-private.
PROVING NON-PRIVACY VIA PARTITION ARGUMENTS
In this section we state the Partition Lemma, which allows the reduction of proving the non-privacy of an n-argument function f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) to proving the non-privacy of a k-argument function f (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k )(k < n). Previous works [5] [6] [7] , relying only on the two-party characterization of privacy, restrict the statement of the lemma to the case where k = 2. The following more general form is an immediate generalization of the special case used in those works. DEFINITION 3.1. A k-partition of a set of n parties (or variables) {1, 2, . . . , n} is an ordered partition of the set into k non-empty, mutually disjoint sets and is denoted (S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S k ).
. . . ; S k ) of the parties, denote by Y i the Cartesian product of the X j with j ∈ S i , and let
Given an n-argument function f , the k-argument function f will be referred to as the function induced by the partition (S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S k ). LEMMA 3.1 (The Partition Lemma [6] ). Suppose f :
. . ; S k ) and every t such that the size of the union of any t sets S i does not exceed t, the induced k-argument function f is t -private.
We remark that the cases of interest in the above lemma are t ≥ n 2 and t ≥ k 2 . The simple proof of the lemma is by direct simulation: an original t-private n-party protocol may be simulated by the k parties, where each "new" party P i takes the role of all original parties belonging to S i , embedding internal communications into the definition of the new protocol. The t -privacy of the new protocol follows from the t-privacy of the original protocol and from the sizes of coalitions induced by .
Note that in using partition reductions to prove the non-t-privacy of some n-argument function, the cardinality k of the partitions can be restricted to range from 2 to n − 1. If k = 1, then the induced function is always fully private (as a 1-argument function), so non-privacy cannot be proven at all. If k = n, on the other hand, then the original problem is reduced to itself, which is not much of a help either.
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR FULL PRIVACY
In this section we state and prove a necessary condition for the full privacy of any n-argument function. This condition generalizes the necessary condition for the two-party case [1, 10] .
In order to simplify (and clarify) the statement and proof of the following lemma, we do not use the most general form possible. We restrict our attention to functions mapping from [m] n (where [m] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , m}) into some arbitrary range Z . The lemma can be applied to functions of arbitrary (even infinite) domains and further strengthened using a generalization of the concept of "forbidden rectangle" from [10] to the multiparty case. 
Any constant function is clearly non-separable. As a less trivial example, Fig. 1 describes a specific function g, whose domain is [3] 3 . This function is nonseparable, as g(1, Proof. The following proof generalizes the proof for the two-party case appearing in [10] . Suppose toward a contradiction that F is an (n −1)-private protocol which computes f . We may assume, without loss of generality, that the parties "take turns" in sending messages; i.e., party P i gets to send messages only in rounds i + nj, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Proof. The intuition behind the proof is simple: In each round, if the active party P i has no information on the inputs of the other parties, the distribution of the messages it sends should not depend on its input. Because otherwise, the nonseparability of f at the ith coordinate implies that for some possible combination of the other parties' inputs, the coalition of all other parties will violate the privacy of P i . Since initially no party has any information on the other parties' inputs, this condition is preserved throughout the execution of the protocol. This argument applies to the final round as well, forcing errors in the final output. We now formalize this idea.
Let C be any communication vector, and let C k denote the restriction of C to its first k entries (i.e., C k includes all messages of C sent during the first k rounds). Let C k denote the restriction of C to its kth entry alone. We prove, by induction on k, that for any two inputs x, y, Pr ( C k 
The case of k = 0 is trivial (both probabilities are 1). We now assume that the claim holds for k − 1 and prove that it holds for k. Assume that P i is the active party in the kth round. By the inductive assumption, Pr( C k−1 | z) is independent of the input z. If this probability is 0, then also Pr( C k | x) = Pr( C k | y) = 0. We may thus assume from now on that (for all inputs z) Pr
Let x, y be any two input vectors, and u, v be two vectors such that u i = x i , v i = y i , for all j other than i, u j = v j , and f ( u) = f ( v) (the existence of such u, v is guaranteed by the assumption that f is nonseparable). For any communication C, the combined view of a coalition, consisting of all parties except P i , includes all messages of C. Thus, the requirement that F is (n − 1)-private implies that Pr( C | u) = Pr( C | v). Since this is true for any communication C, we have in particular that
by an assumption made earlier).
Relying on the fact 4 that for any z the probability Pr(C k | z, C k−1 ) depends only on z i , the input of the ith party, we have that
and finally that
as required.
In particular we conclude that the distribution of messages sent in the final round of F, which are assumed to contain the value of f , is the same for every input. Since f is non-constant, this contradicts the requirement that F computes f (even if we allow the protocol to err with some positive probability smaller than 1 2 ). This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Remark. The converse of Lemma 4.1 does not hold; this necessary condition is not sufficient for full privacy. 5 For instance, consider the function f : {0, 1} 3 → {0, 1} 3 ∪ {1} such that f ( x) equals 1 for x = 000, 110, 001 and equals x otherwise. The function f can be shown to be not fully private via a partition argument, 6 but is clearly not non-separable.
MAIN RESULTS
In this section we prove two results, both dealing with the power of partition reductions. The first (and more significant) shows that this power is rather limited: partitions cannot always be used to prove non-privacy. The second result shows that while this power is limited, it gradually increases as the number of sets in partitions is allowed to grow. Both results can be obtained as special cases of the following lemma. Proof. Let = (S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S k ) be a k -partition of the n = k variables. Since k < k there must be some set S i ∈ whose size is greater than , so without loss of generality we assume |S 1 | > . Define A = {h : S 1 ∩ D h = ∅}. Since |S 1 | > , the set A must contain at least two elements. 7 In other words, party P 1 holds inputs with indices in at least two different sets D i . Denote by f the function induced by the partition . We describe a (deterministic) fully private protocol F computing f , in which each party P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k , holds the input variables with indices in S i . Intuitively, the protocol will specify a "cautious" sequence of partial disclosures of information, guaranteeing that the information disclosed in any execution can be inferred from the value f ( x). Protocol F:
Round 1: P 1 finds the set R ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} of all values j such that P 1 's inputs rule out the possibility that f ( x) = j . It then announces a value a ∈ R, which is determined as follows: We now prove that F computes f correctly and with full privacy. Correctness: We first show that the choice of a in Round 1 is well defined. As illustrated by Fig. 2 , each input value x i is consistent with at most two values for f taken from [k], namely either f = x i or f = j, where i ∈ D j . Since k ≥ 3 it follows that P 1 can rule out at least one value a ∈ [k] from being equal to f ( x), and so R is always nonempty. In order to prove that the choice of a is well defined in the second case of Round 1 as well, it suffices to show that if R\A is empty then the first case must hold. Suppose that |A| = 2 (otherwise the first case obviously holds) and R\A = ∅. Since k ≥ 3, there exists some j 0 ∈ [k]\A, and such j 0 cannot be in R (otherwise R\A would be nonempty). By the definition of f , all variables held by P 1 must be equal to j 0 . Since j 0 / ∈ A, this implies that each j ∈ A can be ruled out from being equal to the value of f . It follows that A ⊆ R, and the first case holds.
The protocol always terminates with an output. We will show that this output is indeed equal to the value of f . Since f ( x) = a, and Privacy: By the definition of full privacy, it suffices to show that for every j ∈ [k] the protocol yields identical messages when run on all inputs x such that f ( x) = j. (Inputs such that f ( x) = x impose no privacy constraint.) Suppose f ( x) = j, where j ∈ [k]. By the protocol, the value of a announced by P 1 in Round 1 depends on R. So it may seem that this message could reveal some information on P 1 's inputs. We will begin by showing that (given the fixed k -partition and the set A associated with it) the value of a chosen in Round 1 depends only on j. This implies that the Round 1 message does not violate the privacy requirements. Case 2. |A| = 2 and j ∈ A. In this case j ∈ A\R, so A ⊆ R and P 1 acts according to the second case in Round 1. Let A = { j,j}. Then P 1 holds some input variable x i whose index i satisfies i ∈ D˜j . By the definition of f , since f ( x) = j, the equality x i = j must hold. Therefore, for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}\A, the inputs held by P 1 rule out the possibility that f ( x) = j . It follows that in this case R\A = [k]\A, implying that a = min([k]\A).
Case 3. |A| = 2 and j
By the definition of f , since f ( x) = j, the equality x i 1 = x i 2 = j must hold. Therefore, for both elements of A, the inputs held by P 1 rule out the possibility that the value of f equals this element. This means that A ⊆ R and P 1 acts according to the first case in Round 1. As A contains two elements from [k] that are different than j, the same reasoning as that in Case 1 implies that in this case R = [k]\{ j}. Now whether Case 1, 2, or 3 holds is completely determined by A and j, the value of f . Given each case, the value a is again determined by A and j. Therefore the value a sent by P 1 at Round 1 does not violate the privacy requirements.
It can be easily verified that for any x with f ( x) = j, the value of all messages sent in rounds 2-4 is equal to j; these messages are sent by the same set of parties, and the protocol terminates at Round 4. This establishes the full privacy of F. Proof. Define g n = f n,1 (Fig. 1 describes the instance g 3 ) . Lemma 5.1 implies that g n (as the function induced by its own n-partition) is not fully private, but every k-partition of its variables, 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, induces a fully private function. THEOREM 5.2. The power of partition reductions strictly increases as the number of sets in the partitions is allowed to grow. More formally, for any k ≥ 3 there exist n-argument functions (n > k) which, for some t, can be proven to be non-t-private using partition into k sets, but cannot be proven to be non-t-private using partition into a smaller number of sets.
Proof. Set f = f k, , where ≥ 2. The proof of Proposition 5.1 exhibits a partition of the k variables of f into k sets of size each, such that the induced k-argument function is not (k − 1)-private. Since each union of k − 1 sets from this partition is of size (k − 1) , the Partition Lemma implies that f is not (k − 1) -private. In addition, Lemma 5.1 states that for every k < k, all k -partitions induce fully private functions, and thus such partitions cannot be used to prove non-privacy of f k, . We conclude that such f satisfies the requirements of Theorem 5.2 with n = k and t = (k − 1) = (1 − 1 k )n.
OPEN PROBLEMS
As indicated by Theorem 5.2, the combination of a generalized Partition Lemma with our necessary condition for full privacy is stronger than the combination of two-partitions and the two-party characterization, used in previous works [5] [6] [7] . This gives hope to characterize wider natural classes of functions using the generalized techniques.
The general problem of characterizing the t-private functions is still wide open. Our necessary condition for full privacy is not a sufficient one, and this leaves even the problem of characterizing full privacy open. To gain better understanding of the information-theoretic notion of privacy, one has to develop new proof techniques for proving non-t-privacy, especially when t < n − 1.
Finally, while this work focuses on existential results, a potentially interesting question is that of finding the maximal range size M, such that partition reductions are universal for proving non-privacy of functions mapping to [M] . The Boolean case characterization of [6] shows that such maximal M is it least 2. Is this bound tight?
